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ABSTRACT
FOOTING THE BILL:
AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT THE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS AND COUNCILOR VOTES ON SPLIT TAX RATES IN
MASSACHUSETTS.

MAY 2020

TRISTAN LALIBERTE

B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Justin Gross

The current literature regarding the relationship between campaign contributions
and roll call voting by elected officials has primarily focused on the congressional level.
This study begins to fill the holes in this topic by utilizing city councilor contributions
from likely business owners and their stance on tax classification in their respective
communities. In this study, I examine contribution data from municipal officials in
fourteen communities in Massachusetts as well as the expressed opinions made by city
councilors in the 2018 tax classification hearings in order to test the theories that (1) there
is a correlation between the actions of political elites and the interests of campaign
contributors at the municipal level and (2) that municipal candidates heavily rely on
contributions from the business community to finance their campaigns. Though the
results are limited, the evidence suggests that if any relationship exists it is negligible and
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unlikely to exist at any level that would validate concern. The findings also suggest that
candidates for office in smaller municipalities are not as dependent on contributions from
the business community as those in large cities or at the congressional level.
Keywords: Massachusetts, tax classification, municipal, campaign contributions,
municipal campaign donations, special interest contributions.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
A. Follow the Money
“Follow the money.” This was the advice given by Henry Peterson to the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 1974 (Doyle, Mieder, and Shapiro, 2012), to uncover instances of
political corruption. Financial gain is the prime indicator, if not the root cause of what has
been perceived to be corrupt practices by lawmakers. In fact, money itself has been
described as the “tracer element” for the “distribution of political power” (Alexander and
Corrado, 1995). The average American is unfortunately all too familiar with its
implications associated with the role of money in the American political establishment. In
the spirit of Peterson’s words, awareness of the financial operations of prominent public
figures has risen dramatically since the 1970s, followed closely by a push for increased
campaign finance restrictions. This should not be a surprising fact. If political corruption
is indeed widespread, then it serves as a very real threat to the American Republic and
would mean that governmental bodies can be easily influenced by those with access to
capital. There is a copious amount of research regarding the correlation between
campaign finance and legislative vote choice at the congressional level. Yet, however
abundant research on the topic may be, it remains hindered by the field’s hyper focus on
one body, of one branch, of one level of government within the United States.
As Tip O’Neill famously stated, “All politics is local” (Matthews, 1999), and yet
we see the attention of political scientists captured by large scale political institutions,
leading to missing information in the area of government which most directly impacts the
lives of the majority of Americans. The decisions made by municipal lawmakers can
1

have an immediate and direct impact on the day to day lives of individuals while the
results of the highly publicized debates that rage in Washington remain hardly felt.
Consider the Congressman from an urban district whose constituents will likely never
notice the impacts of a farming subsidies bill that he cosponsored 200 miles away in
relation to the local official that personally saw to it that the pothole on their constituents
morning commute to work was filled. Despite this, the subject of interest in the political
field has largely been centered on the federal government.
The call for increased attention to the municipal level is as old as Lawrence
Herson’s 1957 plea for “a revitalized study of American city government[s]” (Herson,
1957). By neglecting direct study of municipal actors, political scientists are left with
two potential consequences: either theories developed at the federal and other levels of
government are so well generalizable that they may be seamlessly transferred to
municipal situations; or there are sizeable differences between local and other forms of
government that prevent the transfer of theories. In either case, further empirical studies
of municipal activities are necessary for the field to advance (Marschall, 2010;
Trounstine, 2009; Holbrook and Weinschenk, 2014). By taking a closer look at what
transpires at the local level, we can gain a more complete illustration of the political
scene in American life.
Now more than ever before the easy access to data makes empirical studies at
such a level possible. This study takes advantage of this situation and seeks to find if a
correlation exists between municipal elite action on tax classification and the percentages
of campaign contributions made from business leaders within communities. I do not
make the claim that these contributions necessarily have a causal relationship with
2

officials’ decisions to support friendly tax rates for businesses, rather I simply aim to
discover if there is a discernible correlation between campaign contributions and vote
choice, as has been recorded at the congressional and large scale cities, in smaller
municipalities that typically go unstudied. I also attempt to find any discrepancies in the
sourcing of campaign contributions between large cities that are typically the subject of
scholarly study, and smaller municipalities that are left unchecked.
B. Threats from Unregulated Campaign Finance
In the minds of many Americans, the mention of money in the context of politics
alone is enough to trigger colorful illustrations of party bosses committing morally
heinous acts. Thoughts of corruption and greed coming from political figures, no matter
how accurate or inaccurate they may be, are sure to permeate through the individuals’
subconscious or even conscious mind by the mere mention of money in politics. The
classic image of a greedy politician is one that is commonly played out in various forms
of American culture and entertainment. This long predates effective campaign finance
reform that emerged in the 1970s as the word “corrupt” is not one that has ever been
absent in American literature. In fact, it has consistently appeared at the same rate in
printed texts since America’s founding (Michel, Jean-Baptiste et al. 2010). Worries
surrounding alleged corruption have led to a number of attempts at campaign finance
reform with an ever-increasing push to remove the ostensible influence of money over
politics.
The American public has developed such a negative view of the role of money in
politics that a legitimate campaign strategy has evolved where candidates flaunt their
financial independence from big donors and PACs or even go on the offensive by
3

attacking their opponents for accepting PAC contributions. The 2020 presidential
campaign has been littered with instances of candidates attempting to distance themselves
from wealthy contributors and special interest groups. Candidates on both sides of the
aisle have touted their own personal wealth to establish their own independence from
large campaign contributors, some have even pledged to only accept grass roots and
small dollar campaign contributions. The Democratic National Committee itself has
helped to foster this targeting of small dollar contributions by changing debate
qualification requirements (Milligan, 2020). New guidelines established individual donor
requirements that forced candidates to attract a large amount of very small campaign
contributions. But what is this alleged influence that money has, and why should voters
care to worry about it? And are these steps/actions necessary?
Apart from a few outliers, who have the means to finance their own political
ambitions, candidates for elected office require consistent donations to continue to
campaign and, ultimately, maintain their ability to influence policy direction. According
to Georgetown University, successful congressmen and women had to raise an average of
over $1.5 million for their reelection bids (AN INSIDE LOOK AT CONGRESSIONAL
FUNDRAISING, 2012). This translates to over $16,000 a week. Former Congressman
David Jolly placed that figure significantly higher telling reporters that he was told he had
to fundraise $18,000 per day for both himself and the party in order to secure re-election.
Congressmen and women spend significant portions of their time in Washington calling
potential contributors in party owned call centers near Capitol Hill (Selleck, 2016). A
number of news stations have reported that congressmen spend nearly half of their
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workday making calls in search of the necessary campaign contributions needed to fund
their re-election campaigns and to support their political party.
These extreme measures taken may be unique to congressional officeholders, but
elected officials at all levels of government require continued financial support to,
consistently and successfully, run for re-election. It should come as no surprise that while
these essential funds can come from a number of sources, studies have suggested that the
most common contributors are business owners, (Fleischman and Stein, 1998). While we
often associate corporate sponsors with Washington politics, businesses and business
owners have been found to be a primary source of these essential funds at the municipal
level as well, contributing over 70% of councilor’s war chests (Fleischman and Stein,
1998). Through his analysis of New York and London, Herbert Alexander found that
over 80% of municipal campaign contributions came from businesses, with the majority
of those businesses centered on development interests (Alexander 1991). This suggests
that grass roots and small campaign contributions have historically not been strong
enough to support the financial exhausting process of campaigning, even at the municipal
level. This forces candidates for elected office to seek the necessary funds from sources
that can reliably provide consistent financial assistance. It is through this dependence on
financial support that we find the theorized threat to a republican form of government.
There are two major concerns surrounding campaign finance and the health of a
democracy. The first is that campaign contributions can tip the scales of an election in
favor of the candidate who is able to spend the most money (Holbrook and Weinschenk,
2014). In this case, the threat to democracy is not limited only to candidates who have
their seats purchased through the financial endorsements of major Political Action
5

Committees, but also through the self-financed candidate who is able to spend their own
personal fortune to ensure electoral victory (Steen, 2009). This very scenario is the topic
of much debate now as multiple billionaires sought to win the Democratic nomination for
President in the 2020 election. Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island once warned, on this
very subject, that with no ceilings placed on spending of personal fortunes, “only the
wealthy or those who are able to obtain large contributions from limited sources will be
able to seek elective office”(Boatright, 2006). In this scenario, the threat to the republic
lies in the inability of voters to accurately select which individual should represent them.
Instead, the election’s outcome is predetermined by the campaign contributors and
personal wealth of the candidates as they have the ability to provide the necessary funds
to win the election. In all contested city council races in Los Angeles and Chicago
between 1989 and 1999, 90% of elections went to the candidate that successfully
fundraised the greatest amount (Krebs, 2001). Additional studies have claimed a strong
link between campaign spending and vote share (Arrington and Ingalls, 1984;
Fleischmann and Stein, 1998; Gierzynski, Kleppner, and Lewis, 1998; Poole, Romer,
Rosenthal, 1987). This gives a significant advantage in the polls to the candidate that can
raise the most money.
The second fear regarding monetary influence, and the topic of interest in this
paper, is that special interest groups can “buy” the votes of legislators. There has been
evidence to suggest that a correlation exists between the political goals of campaign
contributors and the voting records of congressmen (Roscoe and Jenkins, 2005). Though
proving that this relationship is a causal one represents an additional layer of debate. The
fear here is that a legislator may cast a vote in a direction preferable to one of their
6

contributors, when had it not been for that contributors’ donation, the legislator would
have voted the other way. Though it has been argued that contributors are simply
efficient at selecting candidates who will be sympathetic to their policy objectives, if
campaign contributions increase the odds of electoral victory, as described above, a
considerable threat of excessive influence over the political system from the wealthy
remains plausible.
Still, there are plenty who argue that direct vote buying takes place. Former
Representative Downey of New York once stated “you can’t buy a congressman for
$5,000 but you can buy his vote. It’s been done on a regular basis”, while former
Representative Bill Brodhead stated very clearly that he believed “Votes are given in
exchange for contributions” (Campaign Finance Reform, 1991). Other representatives
have testified on personal conversations in which congressional leaders admitted to
giving in to their campaign contributors wishes.1 Additionally, a number of scholarly
works have claimed to have proven some level of a causal relationship between
contributions and vote choice (Roscoe and Jenkins, 2005). Nevertheless, even if either
case were true, then unregulated campaign contributions truly would present a direct and
very serious threat to the democratic process within the United States.

Representative Dan Glickman “A member commented to me, ‘I am committed. I got a $10,000 check
from the National Automobile’s Association. I can’t change my vote now.’” Representative Millicent
Fenwick on remarks made to her by a colleague “‘I took $58,000, they want it,’ was the explanation
one colleague gave me for his vote.” See Campaign Finance Reform Proposals of 1983, Hearings Before
the Committee on Rules and Administration, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session,
on the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as Amended, and on Various Measures to Amend the Act,
S. 85, S. 151, S. 732, S. 810, S. 1185, S. 1350, and S. 1684 : January 26, 27, May 17, and September 29,
1983.
1
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C. History of Campaign Finance Reform
With the dramatic and very real threat that the power of financial strength
potentially wields over the American Republic, efforts to limit the influence of the
incredibly wealthy should be encouraged wherever and whenever possible. The study of
campaign finance proliferated in the 1970’s (Michel et al, 2012) with the emergence of
the Watergate scandal and a severe and deep mistrust of the government. Since then,
campaign finance and campaign finance reform have remained a hot button issue that is
periodically propelled to the forefront of modern political discourse. However, the 1970s
did not mark the first-time campaign finance reform was discussed or tried in the United
States. President Theodore Roosevelt pushed for disclosure of contributions to candidates
at the federal level in his state of the union address in 1905 (State of The Union Address,
1905). Initial legislative attempts to create contribution limits and make campaign
donations to congressional offices public information date back to the Tillman Act of
1907. These early efforts were largely ineffective as they could be easily circumnavigated
or outright ignored due to the lack of an enforcing agent. Congress continued to make
periodic efforts to limit the alleged power of unions as well as corporations via their
excessive financial giving’s. The 70s saw a radical revival in attention to campaign
finance reform and reporting. These efforts remained largely ineffective for the same
reasons that the Tillman Act failed to garner real change.
These continued efforts made by congress eventually culminated in the passage of
the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. However, real change did not
come until after the Watergate scandal caused widespread and general distrust of the
government. This resulted in numerous amendments to the FECA which resulted in the
8

birth of the Federal Elections Commission (FEC). With the creation of the FEC, finally
came the long-needed enforcement agent that was able to oversee elections and the
financial disclosure process.
With the creation of the FEC and the sudden public access to campaign finance
reports and data came an increase in scholarly studies relating to campaign finance.
Specifically, this allowed political scientists to begin studying the relationship between
campaign contributions and the vote choices of elected officials (Stratmann, 1995;
Roscoe and Jenkins, 2005). A dramatic and sudden rise in PAC contributions also
contributed to this rise in scholarly research. In fact, between 1974 and 1980, PAC
contributions increased by 500% and the average contributions to congressional office
seekers tripled (Jacobson, 1983). This jaw dropping influx of money into the political
system, combined with a growing distrust of the government in the decade, and public
access to information created the nutrient rich environment for such studies to flourish.
With all these efforts made, by lawmakers to reform campaign finance and by candidates
to appear financially independent, the question remains: are these actions necessary? To
what degree do finances really impact public policy and the formation of the American
republic?
The birth of the FEC represented a major advancement in the campaign to
increase regulations on the role of money in the political arena. However, the discussion
of campaign finance did not end there. The interest and even fear surrounding campaign
finance and the alleged effects of high dollar contributions on policy decisions extends to
members of the mass public. Perhaps the greatest trigger for increased public attention to
the subject in recent memory came ten years ago with the Supreme Court’s ruling in the
9

case of Citizens United vs. the Federal Elections Commission which ruled that
corporations and private entities not associated with campaigns cannot be regulated as it
represents free speech (Citizens United v. FEC, 564 U.S. (2010)). The Supreme Court’s
ruling as well as misinterpretations of their decision has caused a widespread fear that
corporations and the super wealthy will be able to funnel unlimited sums of money into
elections at every level.
Fears surrounding large campaign contributions have not been confined to the
national level. In 1973, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts established the Office of
Campaign and Political Finance (OCPF), which is responsible for tracking contributions
made for all state and some municipal elections. Since then, OCPF has expanded to
include city councilors in some of the state’s largest communities and routinely answers
questions regarding state campaign finance law. The most recent expansion of OCPF
occurred in November of 2019, the Massachusetts Legislature and Governor Baker
expanded the powers of OCPF to include a larger number of municipal offices across the
state (Sullivan Michael, 2019). Across the country, other governing bodies have
attempted to further regulate campaign finance. Recently the Cities of Denver, Portland,
and Baltimore, to name a few, have taken steps to lessen the potential effects of largescale donations (Holder Sarah, 2018). In 2018, the City of Denver placed new restrictions
on the amount of money that individual contributors could donate to city officials
(Omedo, Nike, 2018). Additionally, candidates for office were no longer allowed to
accept any campaign contributions from businesses of unions. The City also implemented
a donation-matching program that would provide candidates with taxpayer dollars
matching the amount of money donated to the candidate, provided that the contribution
10

was less than $50. With these measures, municipal governments have attempted to curb
unethical favorability from politicians based on the source of large-scale contributions.
From setting campaign contribution limits to establishing systems of contribution
matching via public funds, municipalities have sought to minimize the theorized
influence that campaign contributions have.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Despite the supposed dangers to the republic listed previously, conventional
wisdom amongst the political scientists asserts the belief that roll call votes made by
political elites remain largely unaffected by campaign contributions. Instead, any
correlation found between the policies supported by campaign contributors and elected
officials is thought to be the result of the ability for major contributors to effectively and
accurately identify candidates that are already squarely in line with their political
interests.
If the campaign contribution is made in an effort to change an official’s
perspective or to support an official with a particular ideology, then a correlation should
exist. This has been demonstrated at the federal and state levels as political action
committees commonly provide financial support to candidates that are most likely to vote
in a favorable fashion (Pool, Romer, and Rosenthal, 1987).
A. Why Money Matters
A key assumption that this study and much of the literature surrounding campaign
finance has taken is that there is a direct relationship between the amount of money raised
by a political candidate and the likelihood of winning an election. After all, if substantial
fundraising was not a factor in election outcome, then what motivation would candidates
have to make an effort to secure contributions? Likewise, why would campaign
contributors give to candidates that were supportive of their preferred policy outcomes if
not to aid in election? If a candidate was just as likely to win if a contributor did not
donate than if they did, then there would be no motivation to expend financial resources
for that candidate. Thus, a candidate for public office would seek to maximize the amount
12

of funding through contributions whenever possible. Though there can be no disputing
the importance of fundraising in a political campaign, the degree to which it is important
likely remains highly subjective from race to race.
The traditional school of thought in political science dictates that there is no direct
causal relationship between campaign contributions from special interest groups and
voting for policies favorable to that interest group. This has been the typical conclusion
reached by scholars since the conception of campaign finance studies in the 1970s
(Fiorina and Peterson 1998). However, studies have varied in the way they approach the
question, in the number of and what classifies as a control used in the experiment, and in
resulting conclusions. Through their meta-analysis on the results of over 357 tests on the
link between campaign finance and roll-call voting, Douglas Roscoe and Shannon
Jenkins found that about 35.9% of tests found a statistically significant link, arguing in
favor of a causal relationship (Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). Interestingly, Roscoe and
Jenkins also found that the most common form of measuring campaign contributions was
through whole dollar amounts rather than a percentage of total donations. A mere 22.1 %
of tests utilized the percentage of contributions coming from special interest groups
(Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). Examining the percentage of total contributions made to an
official that comes from special interests is a superior method as it highlights the value
that that particular special interest groups’ contribution is to the recipient. For example, a
representative might take several million dollars from special interests, but these
donations may only represent a fraction of total contributions, thus losing the support of
the special interest group by voting against their preferred outcome may not be too costly
for the representative. At the same time, a representative that took a small amount of
13

money from special interests but funded most of their campaign from those contributions
alone, would have a higher degree of dependence on these funds. This reasoning is
supported by the results of the meta-analysis which found that when the percentage of
total contributions from special interests were utilized, 60.8% of tests were significant
(Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). When just examining the dollar amount, only 28.8% of tests
were significant (Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). It should also be noted that Roscoe and
Jenkins wrote about the factors that were controlled for in each study: common factors
included ideology and party ID.
B. Dominant Theory and “Ideological Sorting”
The dominant theory in political science is that any relationship between
campaign contributions and roll call voting is merely the result of special interest groups
accurately identifying candidates that are most likely to vote in their favor. Several
scholars have made this point when arguing that corruption is not as blatant as the general
populous might expect. This hypothesis has been referred to as “ideological sorting”,
while the theory that contributions can change an official’s vote has been called the
“vote-buying” hypothesis (Bronars and Lott, 1997). If ideological sorting is the
predominating theory, then it not only negates the arguments made by candidates in this
most recent presidential campaign that they are superior for refusing special interest
dollars, but suggests that these candidates have made a grave error by not simply taking
advantage of such large amounts of money.
Studies that attempt to prove a causal relationship between campaign
contributions and vote choice will typically attempt to control for factors that have shown
a strong correlation to vote choice. Such factors include ideological views, the political
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party of the individual politician (Smith et al, 2012), or the ideological leanings of the
candidate’s constituency (Markus 1974).
Filip Palda argues this point in his book. Palda suggests that the American
political scene had been consumed by what he described as the “Myth of contributions
and Corruption” (Palda 1994), and that as of the 1990’s, after “exhaustive academic
research [he] has found no conclusive evidence that election money buys government
favors”. Instead, he argues that the attractiveness and easy study of campaign
contributions has detracted scholars from studying other avenues by which big money
might have an impact on the American political system. This point may have merit as it
has been found that a mere 10% of interest groups’ resources are spent on campaign
contributions (Palda 1994). So, while special interest groups may be an essential source
of funding for candidates, contributing to campaigns may not even be the primary source
of lobbying available to these groups. In a similar vein, John Wright has argued that
PACs have been detrimental to the efficiency of the government, by devoting staff and
congresspersons’ time to securing contributions, rather than encouraging them to actually
impact the passage of legislation (Wright, 1985), as is their duty.
Still, at the time of Palda’s writing, other social scientists such as Stephen Bronars
and John Lott, argued that the question remained largely unsolved and continued to
research the topic using different measures. Bronas and Lott developed a method by
which they compared the voting trends of congressmen over the course of their careers as
they received financial support from PACs and after they had announced their
retirements, hence no longer seeking campaign contributions. The study utilized special
interests’ indices on congressmen to determine if their overall support for these special
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interest groups’ policy outcomes changed after they announced retirement. They found
that only one in five special interest groups examined exhibited a significant decrease in
the congressperson’s voting index. The overall finding of the piece was a strong rejection
of the “vote buying” hypothesis.
C. Minority Opinion and “Vote Buying”
In contrast to the dominant school of thought, a few studies have claimed to have
found a causal link between contributing to a legislator’s campaign, and that same
legislator voting for the special interest group’s preferred outcome. In fact, it has even
been argued that campaign contributions are only rational if they do have an impact on
congressional voting (Chappell; 1982, Stratmann; 1992). This argument logically follows
the idea that organizations and individuals contribute to campaigns to benefit from them
in some way. If contributing to a campaign does not guarantee or at least increase the
chances that the candidate, if elected, will vote for the preferred outcome, then what
incentive is there to contribute? Of course, this argument diminishes the theory that
contributing to a campaign is for the purposes of increasing the chances of electoral
success, as it would incentivize contributing to campaigns without the expectation of
guaranteed preferred policy outcomes. Though, to reiterate, much of the literature both in
support and refuting Vote Buying Theory has focused exclusively on the United States
House of Representatives, and on Political Action Committees (PACs), hence skewing
the scope of research results.
Another argument has been that campaign contributions can affect the vote choice
of elected officials depending on the timing of the contributions. John Wright at the
University of Iowa examined the relationship between vote choice and campaign
contributions while looking at when contributions were made. He determined that
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campaign contributions were more likely to have a causal link to vote choice when given
closer to the date of the vote (Wright, 1990).
Not all theories that suggest causal relationships necessarily fall under the
umbrella of vote buying. Instead, it has been argued that with many issues and bills
proposed before lawmakers and only a small amount of time to review them, legislators
turn to a variety of sources to impact their vote. If a bill comes before them that would
have relatively little impact on their constituents, but a rather large impact on a campaign
contributor, then they may be more receptive to lobbyists from the contributor (Roscoe
and Jenkins 2005).
From here, scholars are poised to debate on whether the evidence points to
effective lobbying efforts. Data suggests that tracing lobbying efforts may be a more
effective way of determining the power of contributions. One such study suggests that
committee-level voting in congress is predictable based on campaign contributions from
lobbying groups (Wright 1990). This same study suggests that the lobbying networks
were in fact the better predictor of congressional votes than the contributions made. Still,
there are political scientists who believe campaign contributions may in fact play a role in
the vote choice of elected officials but that the way in which the topic has been studied is
deeply flawed and as a result, any proof of causality has been masked. Scholars have
argued that it is the way that campaign finance has been studied that has led to the
mainstream belief that there is no causal relationship between contributions and vote
choice, rather than the belief that no relationship exists in general.
Eleanor Powell, for example, has pointed out that the traditional method used for
determining if a contribution has impacted a candidate’s policy position is to directly
17

search for a change in the official’s predicted position correlating to a large contribution
(Powell 2013). A method that is in search of unethical or even illegal actions, thus
explaining the lack of hard evidence that big money plays a role in policy outcomes.
Instead, Powell has argued that political scientists should search for more subtle
indicators. In her piece on the impacts of fundraising in congress, Powell examined the
lobbying power of congressmen and women who are able to fundraise large amounts of
money for themselves and fellow officials. It has already been determined that PAC
contributions rally receptive legislators to pressure their colleagues into supporting and or
attaching PAC-supported amendments to legislation (Hall and Wayman 1990).
D. Investment, Networking Strategy, and Incumbency
To understand the alleged relationship between campaign contributions and
elected officials’ policy positions, it is useful to look at the reason organizations
contribute to campaigns. This has been partially addressed in the explanation of
ideological sorting theory. Ideological sorting faces some challenges, as PAC
contributions are more likely to move towards candidates in more competitive districts
instead of necessarily funding the candidate most in line with the PACs agenda (Bronars
and Lott, 1997; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal, 1987). John Wright argues that the overall
objective of PACs is to alter election outcomes, rather than the actual vote choices of the
candidate. The organizational structure of PACs, which places a great deal of allocating
power in the hands of local PAC members, has led to personal relationships between
PAC members and local officials determining their funding instead of the candidates
policy stances (Wright, 1985; and Grenzke 1989). This would suggest that, instead of
ideological sorting, networking and strong relationships is a better determinant of
financial support.
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Bronars and Lott also found that campaign contributions from PACs actually
increased contributions to candidates that lost re-election, a finding that they theorized
was the result of PACs accurately identifying supporters that were engaged in highly
contested races. This course of action introduces us to another theory, one that runs
parallel to those already discussed: that campaign contributors follow an “investment”
strategy when determining which candidates to financially support (Fleischmann and
Stein; 1998).
In the United States, there has been one kingmaking characteristic of candidates
that appears to be essential. This is, of course, the power of incumbency. For numerous
reasons, at multiple levels of government, candidates seeking an office who already hold
the office have a higher chance of electoral success. In recent years, over 90% of
congressional office holders were re-elected (Reelection Rates over the Years, 2018).
Though Congressional lawmakers have enjoyed an incumbent advantage since the late
1960s (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2004), candidates on lower levels of government have
been experiencing the same advantage. By examining the local city council elections in
St. Louis and Atlanta, Fleischmann and Stein found little evidence to suggest that there
was a relationship between the amount of money raised by candidates and the outcome of
the election (Fleischmann and Stein 1998). Instead, incumbency played a significant role
in whether a candidate would win the election. This conclusion was corroborated by
researchers Kushner, Siegel and Stanwick. Therefore, the prior assertion of campaign
contribution interference may be entirely discredited.
Investment strategy can be observed with regards to the incumbents’ abilities to
secure strong financial backing. There has been dispute over whether PACs, like
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businesses, are more likely to support incumbents over candidates with similar
ideological preferences. Barber 2016, Grenzke 1989, and Fleischmann and Stein 1998
substantiate this assessment at the municipal level, claiming that business interests in
Atlanta and St. Louis followed an “investment strategy” when selecting which councilors
to financially support by heavily supporting incumbents and candidates for citywide
office over newcomers and ward councilors (Fleischmann and Stein 1998).
In Krebs 2001, incumbency was tested against several other major predictors for
fundraising, including experience, gender, and political endorsements. The goal of this
study was to definitively assert or toss out the supposed incumbency advantage in
fundraising at the municipal level. The study examined municipal elections from 1989 to
1999 in Los Angeles and Chicago. In Chicago, an endorsement from an incumbent meant
an average of an additional $39,000 towards campaign funds. In Los Angeles, the
difference was over $54,000. Interestingly enough, the study also highlighted the
strikingly little influence that candidate professional acumen and political connections
had on attracting campaign contributions, hence bolstering the theory that there is an
inherent advantage that is had from being the incumbent candidate.
The strategy of financially favoring incumbents indicates that contributions
provide access to legislators more than anything. Special interest groups value having
strong networks to and with powerful legislators, thus making lobbying for policy
initiatives easier. If a supported candidate is not likely to win an election, then having a
strong network with the failed candidate is, clearly, significantly less valuable than
having a strong relationship with the victor, even if the winner is less friendly towards the
groups policy positions. For the main focus of the research, investment strategy can be
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interpreted in two ways: 1) Special interests do not always give to the candidate that
already agrees with them and thus they are attempting to sway legislators, or; 2)
Campaign contributors are attempting to network with legislators, and while the goal may
be to secure access and potential support for friendly policies, this is done through
lobbying efforts made possible through the contribution and not from the contribution
itself.
E. Theories on Municipal Government
Shockingly, despite the vast amount of research that has tracked the connection
between campaign contributions and roll-call voting, and the immense attention paid to
campaign finance in general, the scope of research has largely been limited to the United
States House of Representatives. Few studies have expanded the examination to other
legislative bodies. This focus on the House of Representatives is perplexing since in the
federal system of government within the United States citizens are constantly being
governed by multiple bodies simultaneously. It is possible that candidates for Congress
are subject to strict FEC guidelines regarding the acceptance and expenditure of
campaign contributions and funds, therefore demanding an increase in documentation
and hence additional data. At the same time, large amounts of data have historically been
unavailable for municipalities (Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014). In recent years, as
more municipal data has become available, there has been a noted increase in focus on
municipal government. However, even now the lens is skewed in the direction of megametropolises such as New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago2, and other hubs that operate
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See; (Krebs, 2005; Hogan and Simpson, 2001; Kaufmann, 2004; Grimshaw, 1992; Simpson, 2001; Rast,
1999; Krebs and Pelissero 1997)
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much differently than the majority of cities in the United States. Tragically, many of
these studies have been the focus of developer interest, and there is, by default, far more
developer interest in large cities than smaller municipalities.
This lack of diversity amongst studies was highlighted through a meta-analysis
review of the literature regarding. In their review, Roscoe and Jenkins found that a mere
6% of studies examined the U.S. Senate or state legislature, while 77% of studies focused
on the U.S. House, and the remaining 17% focused on particular house subsets such as
house committees (Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). It is astonishing that a subject of such
widespread discussion and influence has been so severely handicapper in academia by
such a narrow focus. As a result, we cannot conclusively say anything about the role of
campaign contributions on rollcall voting for the majority of elected offices in the
country, because to do so would be a ghastly overgeneralization.
It can be argued that perhaps conventional wisdom has managed to hold strong
because members of the House are under a greater level of scrutiny. We may find that the
Uncertainty Principle, the act of measuring an object inherently changes it, is at play. As
Congressmen are aware that they are key subjects of study, they may artificially alter
their course of action, and elected officials at other levels of government may be less
likely to conform to the perceived correct course of action.
Despite an estimated 350 million dollars spent on campaigns in municipal
elections in 1993 alone (Alexander and Corrado 1992), scholars in political science have
largely ignored campaign finance in local elections. Campaign finance is not unique in
this regard. Some studies have instead focused on the election process alone, and not the
voting trends or actions of individual elected officials. Furthermore, the focus on larger
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cities rather than smaller municipalities, and hence the impossibility for a generalizable
conclusion, leads one to believe that the field is largely dominated by regime theory and
growth machine theory.
However, theories that do exist regarding actions at the municipal level share
common components with their large-scale counterparts. For example, the belief that
donors make strategic contributions to maximize “returns” has also been applied to
municipal governments (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983; Mutz, 1995; Krebs, 2005).
Additionally, this theory argues that it is not incumbency that provides candidates with an
advantage when fundraising, but rather residing on the inside of the dominant “machine
coalition”, thus creating a “system that favors insiders and punishes outsiders” (Krebs,
2005). Once more, the theory prevails that networking plays a strong role in determining
if candidates will receive adequate campaign funding from the dominant political
machine in the local municipality. Unfortunately, no conclusions were drawn as to if
individuals had to comply with the machine coalitions’ policy objectives in order to be
guaranteed financial backing, and the definition of what constitutes a regime remains
loose. This leaves the research on municipal studies with a gaping hole of uncertainty.
Machine Growth theory also suggests that municipal officials rely on those who
are heavily invested in land use such as those involved in real estate or large-scale
development for much of their campaign resources (Logan and Molotch 1987).
Scholars have, to a large degree, failed to examine the campaign finance aspect of
the relationship between special interests and elected officials (Fleischmann and Stein
1998: 674). Furthermore, the attention that has been paid has mostly focused on large
cities with populations of over several hundred thousand people with some studies
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focusing on major metropolises such as New York City, London, Chicago, and Los
Angeles. Geographic political differences aside, it is difficult to claim that a result found
New York City, population 8.6 million, comparable to the town of Montague,
Massachusetts, population 8.2 thousand or to the numerous suburban areas that make up
large swaths of the country.
The research that has been done has suggested that the largest contributions to
candidates come from businesses and business interests (Fleischmann and Stein 1998).
This would seemingly allude to the theory that municipal candidates seeking to fundraise
in order to better their chances for electoral success must invest their efforts in receiving
the support of the business community. Additionally, this would also suggest that
candidates who did win elections would be better connected to the business community.
These studies have little generalizability outside of the time period and individual
municipalities in which they were conducted. Campaigning for municipal seats in the
megacities of London, New York City, and Chicago is simply not comparable to the vast
majority of local municipal races. For example, Mayor Bloomberg’s $109 million
reelection campaign (Best Shaun, 2009) cannot be directly compared to a local school
board race in a small community that barely tops a few thousand dollars. The
discrepancies in campaign finance even in much smaller cities can vary widely. As of
2018, the average incumbent city councilor in the city of Boston, population 685,094,
raised roughly $224,808 per year that they served on the city council.3 The next closest
amongst the 14 largest cities in Massachusetts, the City of Quincy, is almost a quarter of

3

Average annual donations per year calculated by finding the average of the sum of total contributions
made to each councilor divided by the number of years that councilor served in the dataset created herein.
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that amount. In the City of Quincy, population 94,166, with $60,270 per councilor per
year. To put the amount raised by city councilors in Boston into perspective, the average
for each city councilor in the 14 most populous municipalities in Massachusetts is about
$36,138. Even Boston pales in comparison to the major metropolises with populations in
the millions.
Perhaps a reason that studying the actions of elites at municipal levels has been
largely ignored in comparison to studies at the state and national level is that these local
elites are not always easily categorized into ideological classifications. In most municipal
elections, partisan identification of candidates is not placed on the ballot, and when it is,
it is mostly irrelevant as it would be useless in providing an indication as to how that
candidate will approach a plethora of issues. Except for perhaps a few major actions that
can directly impact neighboring communities, most issues that come before a municipal
body offer no wider implications or are entirely unique to the municipality in question.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODS
Through this study I hope to fill in the missing pieces of current literature by
examining the relationships between vote choice and campaign contributions of elected
officials at the local level, to help establish or disaffirm the widely accepted school of
thought in an area that has seen little attention. Rather than focus on the elected officials
in a mega city, I instead turned my attention to smaller and medium sized cities in
Massachusetts. This study utilized city councilor campaign finance data in the 14 cities in
Massachusetts which had contribution data available through the Office of Campaign and
Political Finance (OCPF). Previous studies at the congressional level have tended to
focus on a singular vote or set of votes surrounding the same area, such as national
defense or farming bills. In a similar fashion, this study turns its attention to city
councilor votes on tax classification.
Studies that attempt to find a correlation between campaign contributions and
vote choice must identify a policy proposal to observe how officials with different
campaign contributors respond to it. In congressional studies the policy proposal can be
defense spending, farm subsidies, or any number of factors. From here, the researcher can
examine every congressperson’s roll call vote as well as their campaign contributions.
This is not the case at the municipal level as many issues that come before one council
are specific to that community. However, in Massachusetts and a number of other states,
elected officials in every community are forced to take the same vote on tax
classification. This subject allows us to compare city councilors across multiple
communities. This is beneficial as many studies at the municipal level sacrifice a certain
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degree of generalizability by focusing on large cities that have a large enough number of
councilors to examine, as in the case of Chicago. By utilizing an issue that is applicable
to every community, we can avoid the heavy and arguably ungeneralizable focus on large
cities. Furthermore, the issue of tax classification in Massachusetts has served as the basis
for previous studies regarding the vote choice of individual voters when their financial
self-interests are at stake.4
In addition to its value for theoretical purposes, there are real world applications
and practical benefits to be had from a better understanding of the factors that contribute
to the selection of split tax rates within communities. Municipal budgets across the
United States depend heavily on revenue from property taxes and the setting of these
taxes affects the property values of those in the community, where certain businesses will
choose to locate, and ultimately how much money property owners must shell out to
cover their municipalities bills. Differences in the split rates can mean the differences of
tens of thousands of dollars a year for some businesses if the rates are moved
substantially in either direction. By better understanding the process of adopting tax
classification we can better understand the factors that influence how municipal officials
make one of the most important decisions as a member of that elected body and a
decision that affects millions of people in their own communities across the country.
A. History of Tax Classification
Every year in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, all 351 municipal
governmental bodies, without distinction of property value, racial makeup, or any other
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See Bloom, Howard S. "Public choice and private interest: explaining the vote for property tax
classification in Massachusetts." National Tax Journal (1979): 527-534.
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factor, must vote to raise/lower/maintain their current tax classifications. In 1979, the
Massachusetts Legislature adopted Mass. General Law Chapter 40 § 56, which allowed
municipalities in the Commonwealth to shift the tax burden between property
classifications. This law was made possible by a Constitutional amendment approved by
the voters during the previous year (Bloom Howard, 1979). In short, the statute allowed
municipalities to establish four distinct property classifications: Residential, Open,
Commercial, and Industrial (Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 59, § 38). These categories are
typically grouped into two separate tax rates, one for properties classified as “residential”
or “open space” (RO) and the other for “commercial,” “industrial,” and “personal
property” (CIP) (Cronin S. R., 2017). The creation of tax classification allowed for the
executive bodies of municipal governments to determine which class of property would
pay what proportion of the upcoming fiscal year’s tax levy, essentially determining who
will Foot The Bill for the coming fiscal year.
Chapter 40 was intended to provide financial relief to residents who were
experiencing disproportionately rising property values. As residential property values
increased at a more accelerated rate than commercial properties, municipalities argued
that their residents were supporting an unequal burden of the tax levy (Massachusetts
Dual Tax Rates, 2014). In order to redistribute the tax burden in an arguably more
egalitarian fashion, cities and towns in Massachusetts with large and or growing
commercial sectors began to adopt split rates. As a result, commercial sectors that saw
relatively slower growth rates in property values would still be supporting what was
considered by the policy makers to be a fair share of the tax burden.
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As of fiscal year, 2019, 110 communities have split tax rates, up from 108 in
fiscal year 2018. The costs to a commercial property associated with a split rate can be
quite substantial as there are typically fewer of them to share the burden. As a result,
local chambers of commerce and members of the business community frequently push
for the communities that they operate in to stay at or move towards a single tax rate.
The issue of tax classification serves as a perfect subject to examine a multitude
of political questions surrounding the actions of voters, special interests, and elites at the
municipal level. Despite this, only a handful of studies have made use of tax
classification and to my knowledge, none have used classification to test for correlation
between campaign contributions and roll call voting at the municipal level. By examining
campaign contributions made to city councilors from business owners and coding for
those particular councilors' votes at their respective annual tax classification hearing it is
possible to establish whether or not a correlation commonly purported at the
congressional level is present in Massachusetts municipalities.
B. Tax Classification Explained
This research seeks to examine if there is in fact a correlation between municipal
elite’s support for pro-business policy stances and contributions from business leaders
and members of the local Chamber of Commerce at the municipal level. This will help
shed light on the theories surrounding the potential relationship between special interest
political contributions and the policy positions of elected officials outside of a focus on
development concerns in major cities. Tax classification in Massachusetts offers an ideal
subject for studies of this type.
Every year since 1979, municipal officials at all levels, in every city and town
across the Commonwealth, are asked the same question. How should the community that
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they govern split the tax burden for the next fiscal year? Though the details of the process
vary slightly across communities, the general premise remains consistent. For cities in
Massachusetts, the annual tax classification must be decided at an annual public hearing
where members of the public, including participation from both residents and Chamber of
Commerce/business leaders.
Despite taking place in every municipality in Massachusetts annually since 1979,
the complexities of setting the tax classification are commonly misunderstood even by
the legislators themselves. The most common misconception made by residents and
councilors alike is that setting the CIP split would impact the communities’ total levy. It
is important to clarify that the budget of the municipality does not change based on the
change in the gap between RO and CIP properties (referred to as the CIP split). A
municipality's upcoming fiscal year budget has already been set and approved by the time
of the classification hearing. A shift in the CIP split simply changes the proportion of the
total levy that each property classification will be required to provide.
As an example, the Town of Auburn, Massachusetts, as of 2019, has an assessed
value of residential and open space parcels of $1,275,580,965, or 70.37%, and an
assessed value of commercial, industrial and personal property parcels of $537,119,110,
or 29.63%. If the burden of total taxable parcels was to be divided equally, and the town
of Auburn adopted a CIP Shift of 1, a single rate, then the RO parcels would be
responsible for producing 70.37% of the total levy from taxable properties while the CIP
parcels would only be responsible for producing 29.63% of the total levy from taxable
properties. Each classification would be responsible for producing the percentage share of
the levy equal to their assessed value. This means that the individual taxpayer will be
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responsible for paying $18.66 per $1,000 of assessed value of their property whether it be
CIP or RO based.
Instead, the Town of Auburn, like many other municipalities, has adopted a split
rate. As of November 2018, the CIP Shift was set at 1.25. Thus, the RO share moves
from 70.37% to 62.96% while the CIP share rises from 29.63% to 37.04%. For an
individual’s tax bill this would translate to $16.7 per $1,000 of assessed value of RO
parcels and $23.33 per $1,000 of assessed value of CIP parcels. Put simply, the farther
above a CIP shift of 1 a city or town moves, a larger piece of the tax burden is moved
onto commercially assessed properties. It is possible, though rare, for communities to
travel in the opposite direction. For example, a CIP shift of less than 1 would result in a
heavier tax burden on residentially assessed properties than on commercial.
Chapter 58 of M.G.L. sets complex limits as to the extent to which municipal
boards and councils can shift their tax burdens between the two classifications. The
maximum by which a community can move the rate is unique for each individual
municipality. No community can raise the share of the tax burden on CIP properties to
more than 150% of their full and fair assessed cash value. At the same time, no municipal
board or council can allow residential properties to pay less than 65% of their full and fair
cash value (Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 59, § 5c). At the same time, a municipality may not
pass more than 60% on CIP classified properties. It follows that Chambers of Commerce
would support movement on the CIP shift that is most favorable to commercial
properties.
It is no secret that Chambers of Commerce support the movement on the CIP
Shift that is more favorable to properties classified as commercial. It is not uncommon
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for Chamber members to attend the classification hearing or lobby councils in advance of
the hearing in the form of emails or letters supporting a decrease in the CIP Shift.
In many ways, the issue of tax classification at the municipal level in
Massachusetts is a more fitting subject of analysis than matters that come before the
United States House of Representatives. Massachusetts open meeting law requires that
counselors restrict deliberation to an “open”, or public, meeting. Thus the observers can
see the entirety of the process, including both debate and negotiation amongst lawmakers.
These interactions can be unobservable at the congressional level. Voted on annually, tax
classification allows for analysis of something consistent and generalizable. Finally,
studies performed at the congressional level relied on either a single bill or a mere
handful of bills, giving them only a snapshot of how an individual policy maker might
respond to an issue. This creates a binary set of observations in which the elected official
in question either voted for or against the observed subject. Tax classification provides a
scale of distributed values on which we can place a lawmaker.
Councilors, Selectmen, and Aldermen will usually consider several factors before
discussing the rate in a public hearing. A common factor includes changes in commercial
and residential property values and or changes to the proportion of the total value that
these properties make up. This is found by dividing the value of all taxable properties
classified as commercial by the value of a community's total taxable parcels. As
residential and commercial property values change from year to year and as new projects
are built, renovated, or removed, the percent of taxable parcels comprising commercially
classified properties changes. This change in proportion of the municipalities total value
means that each classification may be paying for a greater or lower share of the levy. For
32

example, if all commercial properties within a community made up 30% of the total
taxable property value within a town and that town had a single rate, then the commercial
properties would be responsible for covering 30% of the towns total levy. Other factors
that may influence a councilor’s decision in setting the tax rate are changes made to the
coming fiscal year’s budget, changes in state aid, or how the communities around them
have moved on the rate.
C. Massachusetts and Selected Communities
Massachusetts, and the cities and towns within it, serve as a suitable
representation for the average city council. The budgets of communities in Massachusetts
depend most heavily on revenue taken in from property taxes to fund their town
operations and services, as is the case with most municipalities across the country (Wu,
2009). As of 2010, 25 states and the District of Columbia have split property taxes (Lee,
Wheaton 2010). All 50 states have adopted laws or restrictions in one form or another
that in some way regulate the campaign finance process of elected officials within the
state. However, no individual community in this study in Massachusetts has implemented
additional campaign finance restrictions on its own and it is relatively rare for any
community to do so. This means that there is consistency in the rules across
Massachusetts, allowing for research to focus not just on a single city, but on councilors
across multiple. The matter of tax classification, as discussed above, must be voted on by
every municipalities’ governing board annually. This again allows for consistency across
town lines and for anticipation by campaign contributors and councilors that this issue
will come up for a vote. These factors allow me to study several cities at once rather than
an individual city council. This is beneficial as more data is available and a larger area
covered thus improving the generalizability of any results found. Additionally, many
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cities and municipalities in the United States do not have populations in the millions. The
fact that every community, with the notable exception of Boston, in Massachusetts has a
population under 200 thousand helps to create a picture of what happens in the vast
majority of communities in the United States, rather than just focusing on major
metropolises. Finally, Massachusetts open meeting law requires that municipal
lawmakers deliberate only while in open meeting. Thus, there is no potential for a deal
between lawmakers to be reached outside of a meeting as to what the tax rate to be.
Instead, all deliberation must happen in the classification meeting, in a way, forcing
elected officials to show their hand.
While the preferred method for selection would be a randomized sampling of
either all municipalities or those with split rates, I was constrained by the lack of a
centralized location for both campaign and contribution data. Though every candidate for
office is required to submit their contribution data, the Massachusetts Office of Campaign
and Political Finance (OCPF) only tracks donations made to city councilors in
communities with populations larger than 65,000 residents. Contributions made to
officials in smaller municipalities are only maintained by individual city clerks. Due to
time constraints, I chose to focus on the communities in which contribution data could be
easily accessed from a central location, in this case; the OCPF online database. As a
result, the research was focused on the 14 municipalities with contribution data readily
available. These communities are, in descending order by population, the cities of
Boston, Worcester, Springfield, Lowell, Cambridge, New Bedford, Brockton, Quincy,
Lynn, Fall River, Newton, Lawrence, Somerville, and Framingham.
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Though not a very large or randomized sample, the 14 communities selected are
comparable to most municipalities in Massachusetts with regard to their movement on tax
classification. However, it is of note that these municipalities have selected much higher
CIP splits than the state average. The Massachusetts Division of Local Services began
tracking the CIP Shifts in each community in fiscal year (FY) 2003. Since then there has
been a significant amount of movement in the average CIP Shift selected by communities
in Massachusetts. Figure 1 shown in the appendix, illustrates the average CIP shift of the
fourteen cities that were selected for this study for each fiscal year from FY 2003 to FY
2019 compared to the state average as well as the average amongst towns that have
adopted split rates. Despite the clear differences in the average CIP split selected, the
average rate in selected communities does rise and fall with the state average for
communities with split rates.
As previously stated, the Massachusetts legislature has placed restrictions on the
degree to which a municipality can shift the tax burden onto commercial properties. For
fiscal year 2019, the maximum CIP split that any community was permitted to move to
would be a CIP split of 1.75, though the communities of Malden and Medford had special
permission to raise rates even higher (Massachusetts Department of Revenue, 2020).
Additionally, every community in the dataset, except for one, was limited to a 1.75 CIP
shift ceiling. The city of Cambridge was limited to a split of 1.638691. This is significant
as not all communities select a tax rate from the same range of available options. This is
important to keep in mind when following where cities choose to place themselves as a
move towards 1.64 may be a tax break for commercial properties in Boston, but a tax
increase to the max for commercial properties in Cambridge.
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At the same time, the communities’ style of government was not completely
comparable to many municipalities in Massachusetts. The chart in the appendix labeled
figure 2 shows the dispersion of communities with and without split rates by their form of
government. We can classify the forms of government in Massachusetts into five
categories: Mayor-manager-council (3), Council-manager(12), Mayor-council(43), Open
town meeting(259), and Representative town meeting(33).5 Of the 14 communities in this
research, all but three were Mayor-council forms of government. The remaining three,
Worcester, Cambridge, and Lowell, were Mayor-manager-council forms of government.
Split rates were most popular amongst these forms of government which indicates that
there are common factors at play within these municipalities driving them to split their
tax rates. Population and the size of their commercial sectors may contribute to this trend.
An observation worth noting but not explored in this piece is that this runs contrary to
what we should expect.6 Unfortunately, this pattern had to be overlooked as a randomized
sampling of communities across Massachusetts had to be ruled out and cities with data
available were utilized.
D. Variables and Data Collection
For the sake of maintaining simplicity, voting record on tax classification is made
the dependent variable. To be completely clear, this is not intended to imply that a
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The municipality of Woburn is the only one in the Commonwealth to have a Mayor-Alderman form of
government which is unique from the other five categories. For the purposes of the chart Woburn was
grouped with the Mayor-Council form of government. As of FY 2019 Woburn has a split tax rate.
6

As power is moved away from the hands of the voters, who have the greatest power in open town meeting
governments, and into the hands of elected and appointed officials, with voters in manager council styles
having the least power, split rates become more likely. This is odd as voters in a community are
predominantly residents who do not own businesses and so we should expect them to vote in their own
financial interest and push to lower their own tax rates at the expense of commercial properties.
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councilor’s vote might necessarily be changed by a large influx of contributions from
business owners. Even in a scenario whereby legitimate acts of political corruption had
occurred; a councilor could vote for a lowered commercial rate and then accept campaign
contributions. Rather, the dependent variable was selected to allow consistency within
this study and with literature on the subject. A potentiality that political scientists should
be cognizant of is the potential impact that voting record may have on campaign
contributions from business owners. Observing a repeated favorable voting record on tax
classification may increase a business owner's likelihood of contributing to that
individual councilor.
The voting records for elected officials are retained by the town or city clerk in
their respective locations. All voting records are made available through a public records
request to the clerk’s office. However, in several cases the votes were easily accessed
through the publicly available meeting minutes posted on city websites. Council votes
were coded on a binary scale. Unlike most studies conducted at the congressional level,
votes could not be coded as simply as assigning a 1 to yea and 0 to nay responses to
determine if an elected official is supportive or in opposition to a motion. In determining
congressional support for defense contracts, a yea vote clearly establishes support for the
contract while a nay vote implies opposition in any time where a contract is in question.
This applies to many congressional studies that have coded the vote choice of
congressmen. However, every motion on tax classification is unique as it is not a binary
decision but rather a choice of location on a linear scale. The motion may be to move the
CIP Split closer to 1, in this case a yae vote typically indicates a pro commercial stance
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and a nay vote a pro resident stance. However, the motion may be to move the split
further from 1, inverting the meanings of a yae and nae vote.
Due to the inconsistencies in implications from yae or nae votes regarding tax
classification, each vote had to be examined on an individual basis. If the motion in
question was movement towards a single rate, an outcome that would be favorable to the
business community, then a yea vote was coded as a 1 and dissenting opinions were
coded as 0. If the motion was an attempt to move the rate closer to or remain at the 1.75
max split, yae votes were coded as 0’s and nay votes were coded as 1’s. This allowed for
individual councilors to be placed into two separate columns; those that preferred a
business outcome and those that preferred a pro-resident outcome. Only one councilor
abstained from voting.7 In this case the councilor's abstention was not explained and she
was assumed to be in favor of maintaining the status quo rather than approving the
motion to move the rate. Thus, an abstention vote was treated as a dissenting vote.
Utilizing only this method for establishing each councilor’s preferred outcome
assumes that dissenting council members prefer the status quo, or the current CIP split to
the proposed movement. However, from viewing recordings of the meetings it became
evident that councilors may vote for a rate change that they oppose in order to prevent a
more extreme proposal from passing. Similarly, it is not out of the question that a
councilor might oppose a motion to move in their preferred direction because it does not
go far enough.

7

Councilor Levy of Lawrence did not explain their abstention. See Lawrence City Council meeting
December 4, 2018.
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Coding for certain councilors had to be corrected. This was only true in the cases
of Marcus Williams of Springfield and Steven Camara of Fall River. Councilor Williams
spoke in opposition to raising taxes on residents at the meeting and argued that “the
residents are my constituents that I am here to represent”.8 Though the vote that
Councilor Williams opposed was one that gave preferential treatment to residents it is
heavily suggested by his statements that his opposition was that the movement was not
far enough. It was clear that Councilor Williams' opposition to the motion was not
founded in a sympathetic view towards commercial properties and as a result he was
coded as a 0 for the meeting, or a pro resident opinion. Councilor Camara advocated and
motioned for the greatest possible split allowed under Massachusetts law for the City of
Fall River. When his motion failed, Councilor Camara dissented from the majority
opinion as it did not move the rate far enough. In this instance it would not make logical
sense to code Councilor Camara as having a pro commercial standing for voting nay and
he was coded for having supported a pro resident outcome.
It is not uncommon to see multiple votes taken or to see elected representatives
debate where to move the rate at any given time. Of the 14 cities that were looked at, only
3, Worcester, Springfield, and Fall River, had debates where multiple motions were filed.
Instances like this provided a significantly more informative view of each councilor’s
perspective on where the FY 2019 CIP split should fall.
As with studies conducted at the congressional level, the most basic unit is the
individual elected official in each community with the ability to cast a vote on tax

8

See Springfield City Council meeting November 28, 2018.
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classification. In Massachusetts, campaign contributions made to any person seeking
elected office must be filed and reported to the local Town or City Clerk. Additionally,
open meeting law requires that all agenda meetings be posted and the minutes, including
vote records, be made available to the public.
The 14 cities that I was able to include in my analysis had a total of 161
individual city councilors. Of these 161, 11 had to be eliminated leaving 150 city
councilors for the final analysis. The details on which 11 councilors were removed will
be addressed in detail later. All campaign contributions made on or before the date of the
municipality’s classification hearing were tallied.9 In the case of Springfield, where the
vote on classification was tabled to a second meeting, donations up until the day of the
public hearing were tallied. Any contributions made between the initial meeting date and
the actual vote were not recorded as they would have occurred after the scheduled vote.
As each of these municipalities operates under a city council form of government, city
councilors were the only elected officials to serve as the subject of study. The one
exception to this is Mayor Joseph Petty Jr., who, due to an unusual style of government,
serves as both the Mayor and Councilor at-large in the City of Worcester, thus despite
being in the executive body, Mayor Petty cast a vote at the tax classification hearing as a
city councilor.
The main predictor variable was campaign contribution data. Under
Massachusetts campaign finance law, any contribution made to a candidate equal to or
greater than $200 requires that the contributor disclose their occupation and employer. In

9

Classification dates varied from community to community and had to be determined by reviewing
meeting minutes and agendas.
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all cases where occupation and employment were provided, the columns were scanned
for words that indicated the contributor was likely a business owner or had a vested
interest in the success of commercial entities. Keywords that indicated ties to businesses
within a community consisted of; “CEO”, “Chief Executive Officer”, “Management”,
“Manager”, “Founder”, “Vice Chair”, “Vice Pres”, “V.P.”, “Chairman”, “Director”,
”Executive”, “Owner”, “Self”10, ''Partner”, “President”, or “VP.” From here it was
possible to determine which contributions came from those who were either business
owners or involved in upper management positions and thus likely members of the
business community. If any of the above-mentioned words or phrases appeared as a
contributor’s employer or occupation column then the contribution made by that
individual was considered from a person with ties to commercial properties.
The contribution totals from business leaders were then divided by the candidates
total donations accepted to get the proportion of total contributions given to each city
councilor that came from potential business leaders before their vote at their respective
municipality’s tax classification hearing. Studies at the congressional level have varied in
whether to assess the dollar value or the proportion of contributions from business
interests (Roscoe and Jenkins, 2004). In theory, examining the percentage of total
contributions coming from business owners should highlight the significance of business
contributions to a candidate's overall war chest. A councilor who has over 50% of their
contributions coming from business owners is more dependent on that block of donors

While the word “Self” was used to indicate if an individual was “self-employed,” it is important to note
that in several occasions contributors who were stay at home parents also labeled themselves as “selfemployed,” thus creating potential for a slightly inflated number for campaign contributions.
10
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for financial support than a councilor who only has 10% of their contributions coming
from business owners. This dependence is not as easily recognized if we were to just
examine the dollar amount of contributions. In that case, politicians who were
particularly skilled at fundraising in general may have higher than average contributions
from business owners, but they may make up a small proportion of their overall
contributions. This could also apply to city councilors that had been in office for a longer
period of time and as a result had received a large amount from businesses over a 20-year
career but were not dependent on that block.
A few other potential predictor variables were considered and factored into the
analysis. Councilors in leadership positions were added as a dummy variable and coded
as a 1 if they served as a Council, Chair, Vice-Chair, President, Vice President, or, in the
case of Worcester, Mayor. All other councilors were coded as 0s. All councilors were
coded for their roles on the date that the FY 2019 tax classification hearing occurred in
their respective communities. It should be noted that there were officials in several
communities that had previously held leadership roles. This was not accounted for when
coding for the leadership dummy variable.
Incumbency, At-Large, and a Gender variable were added as well. The
incumbency variable was created to mark individuals who were incumbents in the last
election as, by definition, all councilors were incumbents at the time of the vote.
Councilors who were serving their first term at the time of the classification hearing were
coded as 0s and those who were on a second term or greater were coded at 1. Gender and
At-Large seats were also coded on a binary scale.
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The final predictor variable factored into the model was the change in percent of
each municipality's total property value comprised of CIP properties from FY 2018 to FY
2019. Since tax rates have an ultimate impact on the value of properties and the new
growth of different property classifications can impact what proportion of the tax levy
each classification is responsible for paying, it is reasonable to believe that the tax rate
may be impacted by changes in commercial growth. Because of the potential influence
that this variable can have over the decisions of municipal officials, I control for it in the
equation. Cuts to municipal cherry sheets, or state aid, in Massachusetts have been found
to correlate with and cause increases in the overall tax levy of communities (Wu, 2009).
However, reduced state aid has not been found to directly impact the division of the tax
burden regarding split rates and as a result, state aid was left out as a predictor. Also not
controlled for were the selected rates of the neighboring communities of those selected.
While there is some evidence to suggest that the actions of neighboring municipalities
regarding commercial tax rates may have had minimal influence over the decisions of
officials in British Columbia, a race to the bottom strategy leading to detrimental
economic impacts has been rejected (Brett, and Pinkse; 2000)
Missing or null data was produced in two ways, unavailable contribution data and
or a missing voting record on the city councilor in question. For the former, councilors
may not have had their contribution data available through the Office of Campaign and
Political Finance’s (OCPF) database if they had established a bank account associated
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with the campaign prior to filing with OCPF11. This only applied to six councilors.12
Councilors who were absent from the classification hearing were unable to cast votes. In
all of the subject cities, a total of eight councilors were not present for the hearing.13 As a
result, there was no way of determining their preferred movement on CIP split for FY
2019. Councilors with missing data were removed from the dataset for the statistical
analysis portion of this research. Several councilors had missing contribution data and
were not present at the classification hearing. In the end, the dataset was left with 150
unique observations. It should be noted that the campaign contribution totals and totals
from business leaders still utilized councilors who had available contribution data but
who were not present for the classification hearing.
E. Statistical Equation
For the purposes of this study, the dependent variable, councilor’s vote on tax
rate, is coded on a binary scale; 0 for opposing a commercially friendly split and 1 for
supporting a commercially friendly split. By coding on a binary scale, we are able to
simplify each councilor's position on the matter of tax classification and remove
discrepancies in the value associated with the CIP split between cities. A councilor in Fall
River that supports moving in a pro-business direction may support moving closer to a

11

In these cases, candidates either did not have to file with OCPF when they first ran for office or had
previously had an account that did not have to register with OCPF (such as selectman and or other minor
offices). In these cases, OCPF did not log contributions retroactively and so contribution data along the
councilor's careers may be incomplete. This does not pose much of a threat to the study as most city
councils had data available through OCPF and even councilors that may have had previous contributions go
untracked, any donations made specifically for them to run for city council would be logged.
12

Contribution data was not available for councilors Leonard J Gentile, Gregory Schwartz, Victoria
Danberg, and Cheryl Lappin of Newton, and Margaret Shepard and Edguardo Torres of Framingham.
13

Councilor, now Congresswoman, Ayanna Pressley of Boston, James Milinazzo of Lowell, Debora
Coelho of New Bedford, Leonard Gentile, Cheryl Lappin and John Rice of Newton, Edguardo Torres of
Framingham, and Adam Gomez of Springfield were absent at their city’s classification hearings and thus a
voting record was not available.
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single rate by 0.01 but not by 0.03 due to concerns surrounding the financial burden that
such a move would place on the average homeowner in a single fiscal year. At the same
time, a councilor in the City of Newton, which saw a larger amount of new growth in
their commercial sector, might be more willing to move by 0.03 as the result on the
individual homeowner will be significantly lower. Thus, for purposes of simplification,
both councilors in this study would be coded at 1 for supporting a favorable outcome for
commercial properties.
If we were aware of every councilors ideal location on the CIP split scale for a
given fiscal year, then a continuous dependent variable would be possible. However, with
the data made available at this time, I am simply looking for the probability that a city
councilor will take a pro-commercial stance on tax classification, given campaign
contributions from likely business owners. This can be expressed as the following:

In order to test the relationship between the dependent variable on campaign
contributions as well as the other predictor variables, I implemented a logistical
regression model outlined below.

Equation 1
Where p is equal to the probability of a councilor supporting a commercial friendly tax
rate and Beta represents the predictor variables. In the above equation, 𝛽

1𝑋1

is equal

to campaign contributions, 𝛽

3𝑋3

is equal

2𝑋2

is equal to the change in CIP value, 𝛽
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to incumbency, and 𝛽

4𝑋4

is equal to At-Large races. From this model we can find the

change in probability that we will arrive at a 1, a pro commercial vote, given a change in
any of the independent variables. Logit or the similar probit models are a common tool
utilized by scholars when studying the voting behavior of elected officials.14

14

See (Segal, Cameron, and Cover, 1992; Welch, 1982; Stratman, 2002).
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CHAPTER 4
THEORY
The main question at the heart of this research is whether or not a strong
correlation exists between campaign contributions and vote choice at the municipal level
and if increasing contributions from business owners will significantly increase the
likelihood that a city councilor will vote for a pro-business outcome. While this paper
does not attempt to prove that there is a causal link, in both “vote-buying” and
“ideological-sorting” theories, a correlational relationship should be expected when other
factors are controlled for. An additional question is to what extent do city councilors in
smaller municipalities depend on contributions from the business community? If past
research conducted on cities truly is generalizable across municipalities and not limited to
the large-scale elections of New York, Chicago, and other major cities, then we should
also expect to find a high dependence on business contributions for funding these
campaigns. Even through the machine model, businesses were responsible for
contributing upwards of 40% or nearly half of all campaign contributions to candidates
within their preferred group. We should expect to find a similar level of dependence
amongst councilors in these cities as well.
So, our two hypotheses going forward are; 1 that a strong correlation will exist
between campaign contributions from likely business owners and an increased
probability that councilors will vote for a commercially friendly tax rate, and 2 that city
councilors should receive a majority of their funds from business owners.
A key assumption that this and other studies in this vein must inherently make and
rely on is that the issue of tax classification is one that is of great importance to the
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campaign contributors in question. Either because campaign contributions are expected to
gain supportive votes on tax classification, as in vote-buying, or because businesses
choose to support candidates who already hold such a position, as in ideological-sorting;
either case depends on tax classification being a guiding factor for businesses to use. An
additional assumption that was already discussed is that campaign donations increase the
likelihood of electoral success.
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CHAPTER 5

RESULTS
A. Frequentist Logit Model Results
The percentage of contributions taken from likely business owners varied widely
by both councilor and by community. In general, the results seemed to indicate that
business owners were not necessarily the largest contributors to campaigns. A number of
councilors had accepted no financial support from business owners while the most
dependent councilor relied on them for 76.33% of their total contributions. While it was
expected that most councilors would have similar results, the overall average was a mere
18.13%. With a considerably large standard deviation of 12.31%, suggesting variation in
dependence on business owners for campaign funding.
Interestingly, the average proportion of campaign contributions from business
owners to councilors that opposed a lower tax rate for commercial properties was greater
than the overall average at 18.43%. Strangely, city councilors that supported a pro
commercial rate only averaged about 17.28%. These results do not suggest that
councilors with pro-business positions are more dependent on the business community
for contributions and if anything, imply the opposite. In real dollars, and adjusted for the
number of years they served on the city council, the average city councilor that supported
increasing commercial tax rates took in an average of $8,710.33 annually from businesses
while those that opposed commercial tax increases averaged $2,902.26 a year. Those that
gave preferential treatment to residents tripled the amount of donations annually from
business owners. Though this may in part be a product of the tendency of councilors to
vote together as a community, with some communities averaging substantially higher
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contribution totals in general. For example, the Boston city council voted unanimously
and without discussion to remain at the highest commercial tax rate allowable under
Massachusetts Law. The City Councilors in Boston also collected the largest amount of
money from businesses and overall, by a substantial amount, thus likely skewing results.
This measure may be more indicative of the variation in the cost to campaign across city
lines. Still, the results of the proportional analysis highlight reliable findings that directly
contradict the expected outcome.
Table 1. Logistic Regression Model Utilizing a Proportion of Campaign
Contributions from Business Owners.
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The table above clearly shows that none of the variables attain any level of
statistical significance besides the change in CIP value. In FY 2019, the state average CIP
percent of total value was 14.31% while the average for communities that split their tax
rates had an average of 21.13% and communities with single rates had an average of
11.20%. The average for the 14 communities in this study was 20.94%. This wide
discrepancy in proportion of property values coming from commercial entities suggests
that a growing or shrinking commercial tax base is a strong indicator of where a
community chooses to set its split. This makes sense, as communities that inherently
attract commercial activity can force higher taxes on the business community which is
willing to pay in exchange for operating in a profitable environment. Additionally, as one
group of property parcels grows in value faster than the others, it automatically begins to
pay a greater share of the tax burden. As a result, communities wishing to move on a tax
rate must consider how much of an increased burden they will be placing on properties
that have already increased in value. But even when this factor was controlled for in the
equation, we fail to find a correlation between vote choice and campaign contributions.
In response to this result, contribution data was divided into three separate
variables to try to find evidence of a correlation. The first variable was proportional
contribution which was shown above and discussed in methods. The second variable
represented only campaign contributions made to city councilors between their last
election and the vote on tax classification. In doing this, I hoped to limit any potential
discrepancies that might have arisen from longtime councilors and newcomers. The logic
here being that longtime councilors had been accepting contributions in some cases for
over 20 years, while others had only done so in the last two years. By limiting all
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councilors to the last election there was a clear start and end date for contributions to be
collected. These contributions also represented those made to councilors most recently
before their vote on tax classification. In this case, as Massachusetts Law requires all
cities to hold their elections in November (Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 43, § 126.), this
means restricting contribution data from November of 2016 to November of 2018.
Finally, the third variable only considered campaign contributions made to city
councilors that were valued at over $200. These contributions were singled out for two
reasons; the first being that they represent large contributions being made to individuals
and the second being that when this large amount is given, contributors are required to
disclose their occupation and employer. Even when substituting the main independent
variable with several diverse measures of campaign contributions from businesses, there
remained no observable relationship in the logit model results. The table associated with
these additional logit models can be found labeled as tables 5 and 6 in the appendix. The
results of the equations are similar to those in table 1 in that none of them achieved
statistical significance. However, it may be worth noting that rather than the odd negative
correlation found in table 1, both returned positive correlations.
Of the three ways that business contributions were recorded, only donations over
$200 averaged over 20% of contributions from business owners. From these it is clear
that business owners made up a low proportion of contributions to city councilors in each
city. Again, each variable displayed wide variation in how dependent councilors were on
business contributions, even in the same voting blocs within the same cities.
In 2004 the Massachusetts legislature temporarily increased the amount that a
municipality could raise their CIP Split to (Massachusetts Department of Revenue, 2004).
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The Cities of Boston and Fall River were the only municipalities in the dataset to move to
the new extreme that year. Since then, councilors in Fall River have maintained a level of
fluidity with the rate while Boston has remained at or above the maximum allowed by
law.15 In fact, since the Department of Local Services (DLS) began collecting data in
2003, the City of Boston has never moved to lower commercial property taxes unless
required to by law. It may be the case that cities like Boston, where the CIP Split is
always set at the max, feel unable to pursue movement and so they focus elsewhere.
Additionally, due to its size, business owners within the City may be focused on lobbying
city councilors on other matters.
A potential reason for the results shown above is that several of the selected cities
have stayed at the maximum tax rate for commercial properties over the last several
years. Not only have these cities stayed at the highest tax rate allowed by the
Massachusetts Legislature, but most had very little discussion or attempts to move away
from such a rate. As a result, businesses in these communities may be more accepting of
the high tax rate and instead donate based on other factors. By quickly looking at the City
of Worcester, where tax classification is always a contested topic, we can see the trends
described above have reversed slightly. As can be seen from the heat map in the
appendix, Worcester is unique in that it does not neighbor many other communities with
split rates. In fact, Worcester neighbors only one community, Auburn, with a split rate.
Worcester is the only city in this study in which this is the case. As such, the city is in a

15

On certain occasions the City of Boston has requested that the Massachusetts Legislature allow it to
increase the tax rate beyond the set maximum as part of MGL.
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unique situation in which it must compete with neighboring communities to attract
commercial enterprises.
In Worcester, councilors that voted for a more pro-business tax rate, averaged
$37,322 from the business community while those opposed averaged $18,752. Though,
proportionally, councilors that opposed a pro-business rate relied more heavily on
business donations, the difference was almost indistinguishable. Councilors that
supported a commercially friendly rate had an average of 16.3% while those opposed
averaged 17.1%. Worcester is not the only community selected that has moved on the tax
rate.
The table below shows the results of the regression model when cities that had no
dissenting votes amongst city councilors and where the council unanimously decided to
stay at the maximum tax rate allowed by law. By doing this, I hoped to remove cases
where the chances of moving in a pro commercial direction were low enough that
businesses in the municipality would not expect to see movement and would direct
campaign funds to councilors with friendly policy positions outside of the tax rate. These
cities were Boston, Lowell, Lynn, and Somerville, leaving the dataset with 10 cities and
108 unique councilors.
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Model with Dissenting Votes and Unanimous
Decisions Removed.

The regression results are similar to those listed above. As originally determined
by the previous method, no correlation between contributions and vote choice is found to
be statistically significant. If we turn our attention to city councils as whole bodies, the
average percentage of contributions to council members from business owners varied
from Framingham’s low 5.03%16 to Lowell at 23.92%. The city with the second lowest

Framingham’s abnormally low percentage of contributions from business owners is likely since it
recently transitioned to a city form of government. Prior to 2018, Framingham was under a town meeting
form of government with a population just under the 65,000-person threshold. When the city transitioned,
16
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proportional average was Lynn, at 12.93%. It is worth noting again that Lowell was
removed from the dataset used in the model above because of the unanimous decision by
the city council to remain at the highest commercial property tax allowed by law. Despite
this, the Lowell City Councilors had, on average, the greatest dependence on
contributions from business owners.
It can be argued that these results are in part because the majority of these cities
approved the first rate proposed with little discussion or debate. Dissenting opinions were
quite rare in general (see table 7 in appendix). So, if we instead look more closely
specifically at the cities in which councilors debated classification and took votes on
multiple proposed rates, we should, in theory, see more of a result. The three cities in
which multiple votes were taken were Springfield, Worcester, and Fall River. Between
the cities there were four total pro-business votes which came from councilors in Fall
River and Worcester. Of these four councilors, two had average proportions of their
campaign contributions from businesses higher than their community’s averages while
the other two were lower than their municipal averages.
Recall that Springfield had a lone dissenter whose argument was that the rate did
not go far enough. Springfield was unique in another situation as well as one Councilor
voted with the majority to adopt the pro resident rate, however, that same councilor also
made the original motion to adopt a pro commercial rate. This councilor did have a
higher proportion of contributions from business than the community average. For a
closer look at these councilors, see table 8 in the appendix. While the sample size is

OCPF began collecting data on the city councilors, many of whom had been members of the select board
when it existed. As a result, some campaign contribution data was skewed.
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significantly smaller from looking so closely there is no indication that higher campaign
contributions are indicators of pro-commercial votes.
Table 3. Logistic Regression Model Utilizing Only City Councilors with the
Greatest and Smallest Proportion of Contributions Coming from Business
Owners.

The final logit model tested (displayed above) limits the dataset to the 20
councilors that were most and 20 that were least dependent on campaign contributions
from business owners. While there was no statistically significant finding from the
previous models, it may be that councilors in the dataset that are most dependent on
businesses to fund their campaign war chests are more likely to attempt to show their
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friendliness to business friendly policies. At the same time, those that are financially
independent from the business community may be more willing to vote against
commercial interests. Though the table above does show that the Total Proportion
variable is positive and thus moving in the theorized direction for a correlation, there
remains no evidence that a strong correlation exists between campaign contributions and
vote choice. Out of the 20 most dependent councilors, only 4 of them voted for a probusiness tax rate while 7 of the 20 least dependent councilors voted for a businessfriendly rate.
B. Bayesian Model
In addition to the frequentist models used above, I utilized a Bayesian statistical
model to uncover a relationship that might have been too subtle to discover with a typical
frequentist method. By utilizing a Bayesian model, we can find traces of a more subtle
relationship that may not necessarily be obvious when relying on a p-value to determine
statistical significance. This process began with a Bayesian binomial regression model,
the Bayesian counterpart to a frequentist logit model.
From here we can see the probability that any given councilor will vote for a pro
commercial rate without factoring in any predictors. We find that the probability of
voting for a pro commercial rate for any city councilor averages on .26 with an 89%
confidence interval that it is between .21 and .32. So, already we can determine that
amongst councilors in this dataset, the probability that any one of them will make a probusiness vote is very low and instead have a tendency to favor residential properties. This
is not too surprising considering the sample size consists of cities that have already
adopted split tax rates above the state average and are already more likely to favor their
largest constituency, residents.
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Now that we have a base probability, we can incorporate our predictor variable
and determine what the change in log odds that a City Councilor will vote for a procommercial tax rate will be, given an 𝜒 increase in the percent of campaign contributions
coming from businesses. However, rather than see an increase, we actually find a
decrease of 10% in the odds that a councilor will vote for a pro-business tax rate when we
increase campaign contributions from business owners. This also reflects a direct
contradiction to the expected result.
C. Switching the Dependent Variable to Incumbency
While not the focus of this research, it may be useful to examine the effects that
the other predictor variables had on the contributions that councilors received. This is
particularly true of incumbency, as previous studies have suggested that incumbents are
better advantaged in raising money. In the following model, I switched the dependent
variable to campaign contributions from members of the business community and
implemented a multiple regression model to allow for a continuous independent variable.
As previously stated, it is not clear if campaign contributions are caused by pro
commercial votes or if pro commercial votes are caused by campaign contributions.
Thus, the results from inverting the dependent and independent variables in this case is
reasonable and is a legitimate subject of interest.
Table 4. Multiple Regression Model Utilizing Incumbency as the Dependent
Variable.
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MULTINOMIAL (Figure 5.)
The outcome of the regression model is shown in the figure above. The results
indicate that only incumbency and at-large factors surpass the statistical significance
threshold with p values less than .05. Recall that the leadership variable did not consider
those that had previously served in leadership positions, but campaign contributions were
tracked over the course of a councilor’s career. As a result, this variable may not be a
completely accurate representation of how campaign contributors respond to those in
leadership roles.
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City councilors that ran in the previous elections, and thus were incumbents in the
most recent election, averaged 19.95% of their campaign contributions from businesses.
Those who were first time campaigners averaged 14.5% of their contributions from
business owners. The overall mean for the variable was 18.63% In hard dollars, this
discrepancy equals a difference of around $29,157 as incumbents took in an average of
$40,195 from business owners while newcomers averaged only $11,037. These numbers
may appear slightly distorted since campaign averages varied from community to
community.
Turning attention to at-large councilors versus ward councilors there is evidence
of a similar pattern. Councilors at-large averaged 20.63% of their contributions from
business owners while ward councilors averaged only 16.53%. This translates to $25,110
for ward councilors and $40,860 for at-large councilors. The greater dependence on
campaign contributions from at-large councilors may simply be from the fact that at-large
councilors represent significantly more commercial properties than their ward
counterparts who may represent majority residential neighborhoods. This simply gives atlarge councilors more opportunities to accept contributions from owners of commercial
property.
These results are consistent with the findings of Fleischman and Stein who argued
that campaign contributors followed an “investment” strategy when choosing who to
support. It is important to note that this additional model was only meant to compliment
the lack of findings in the logistic regression model with the previous dependent variable
and not to prove the importance of incumbency. While the results appear to signify that
incumbency is a strong predictor of receiving contributions from business owners,
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candidates that did not win in 2018 were not considered and so the data that is used only
represents successful city council elections. Furthermore, no conclusions are explicitly
drawn from these findings in this study but rather this serves as evidence to suggest
future studies should alter the questions being asked.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
The results of the models from the previous chapter clearly indicate no discernible
correlation between campaign contributions from business owners and a councilors
support for movement on tax classification. In no configuration of the dataset did the
relationship between campaign contributions and support for a pro-business rate achieve
statistical significance. Even in a Bayesian model it could not be definitively determined
if any relationship did exist if it was a positive or a negative one. In fact, some results
even suggested that, overall, city councilors that opposed decreasing the tax rate for
commercial properties were more dependent on members of the business community for
necessary campaign funds. The Bayesian binomial regression model failed to
conclusively determine the direction of any supposed correlation.
Since there is no reason to believe that city councilors who oppose movement
towards a single tax rate would be more successful in capturing the financial backing of
the business community, we are left to draw two potential conclusions. The first being
that the use of tax classification as a measure or the unfortunately skewed sampling of
municipalities potentially blurred any observable link between campaign finance and vote
choice or that these results have suggested that neither ideological sorting nor vote
buying theories are applicable to elected officials in smaller municipalities.
The results do, however, indicate that city councilors in smaller municipal
governments do not heavily depend on campaign contributions from business owners.
The averages seen in other much larger studies were clearly not observed in this case as,
at the most liberal projection, City Councilors averaged a quarter of their campaign
63

contributions from business owners. This is nowhere near the 70% plus that was expected
from past research at the municipal level.
There are an unknown number of factors that have the potential to impact an
individual official's vote on tax classification and where they believe the community as a
whole should be. As with any model, only so many factors can be accounted for. This
study was able to examine a handful of potential predictor variables. However, even
when they were controlled for, we failed to find a statistically significant relationship.
There are several reasons to believe that by utilizing the subject of tax classification, any
potential correlation between campaign contributions and vote choice was masked.
While the selected cities here were relatively small when placed in the large
framework of scholarly work on urban government, they represented the largest
communities in Massachusetts. Since the Office of Campaign and Political Finance only
collects data on councilors in Massachusetts cities with populations greater than 65,000
residents, by definition, only campaign finance data on fairly large cities is centrally
located. As previously discussed, these cities adopted higher commercial property tax
rates than the average municipality. A wider sample size or a sample that included
communities with a greater degree of volatility in selecting split rates may have been able
to uncover a stronger relationship than the results found. Additionally, projected new
growth for the coming fiscal year, strongly influenced city councilor’s votes. This is
something that is outside of the control of the business community or city councilors.
It is possible that lobbying for a lower tax rate may be of relatively low
importance to the average business owner. While it would be in their financial interests to
lower the tax rate, the cost of doing business in their chosen community has already been
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factored into expenses. This may have been amplified in the selected communities as it
can be argued that they were already more likely to have high commercial tax rates. As a
result, business owners and members of the business community, assuming the split rate
was already out of their control, may be looking at different factors when considering
whose campaign to contribute to. Thus, while no strong relationship was found to exist
on this issue, it may exist elsewhere.
The purpose of this research was not to suggest that the votes of municipal elected
officials could be purchased, but rather if a correlation between contributions and vote
choice, which has been found at the congressional level, exists amongst people in much
lower offices. After all, if a link had been found it may only imply that campaign
contributors are highly interested in selecting candidates with friendly positions on policy
proposals. Nevertheless, if contributions did alter an official vote then there would have
been some evidence of correlation.
With the possible limitations in mind, there are some legitimate and very
important takeaways from the results. No matter how the data was configured or what
method was applied, there was no discernable link between campaign contributions from
likely business owners and a councilor’s vote on the split tax rate. This suggests that
campaign contributions are completely ineffective at predicting the policy positions of
elected officials at the municipal level.
The fact that there was no discernible link tells us that contributions likely have
little to no impact on how an official will vote. While the results should be taken with a
grain of salt due to some of the complications described here, there remains simply not
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enough evidence to suggest that any strong relationship exists between the vote choice of
elected officials and that officials campaign contributions.
This evidence is in line with the traditional findings of political scientists only in
part as the findings also tell us that contributors do not necessarily look for candidates
with favorable policy positions. The lack of an observable relationship in this case not
only runs contrary to the vote-buying hypothesis, but also to the ideological-sorting
hypothesis. Instead, it appears that other factors such as incumbency may matter more
heavily to campaign contributors. When the dependent variable was switched, the
incumbency and at-large variables were the only statistically significant determinants of
whether a city councilor would receive campaign contributions.
The results of the analysis also highlight that candidate’s dependency on
campaign contributions from business owners is not nearly what has been suggested in
studies of much larger municipalities. This was proven through multiple categorizations
of the data involved and can have several implications that likely all have some degree of
merit to them.
As stated earlier, Massachusetts as a state does not allow businesses as entities to
contribute to campaigns. This may have severely limited the effective power of the
business community in Massachusetts elections and in policy making. While individual
business owners can contribute, as we have shown here, the forced use of personal funds
may have effectively deterred business influence. If true, this is a finding that can have a
significant impact on the future of campaign finance reform. This hypothesis could and
should be further investigated either by comparing the effectiveness of the business
community in securing preferred policy outcomes in other states and in Massachusetts, or
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by taking an internal look at Massachusetts before and after the new restrictions were
adopted.
Most of the research done on municipal levels has been, understandably, confined
to very large cities due to a severe lack of centralized data. This study itself was hindered
by such an obstacle. As a result, the majority of published scholarly work has found that
large city elections are mostly funded through business and development interests. These
cities, such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, as well as many others, have very large
and influential commercial sectors. In addition to their large commercial sectors, these
cities also have huge populations which translates to a greater number of potential voters.
As a result, significantly more money must be spent on reaching out to these voters,
whereas in a much smaller community, it is easier to gain prominence and familiarity
with residents without substantial spending. So, while candidate Rudy Giuliani may have
required sizable financial support from the business community to effectively reach the
millions of residents of New York, Mayor Joseph Petty may be able to succeed with a
fraction of the spending.
This discrepancy between small and large cities was discernible even amongst the
comparable cities in this Study. City Councilors in Boston were far more dependent on
support from the business community to finance their campaigns than any of the other
selected cities. These local candidates in smaller communities can secure more funding
from their fellow residents and, as a result, have greater independence from business
owners. This also explains the correlation found between business contributions and at
large seats. Ward councilors are running for office in their respective neighborhoods
where they likely already have name recognition and less need to spend large amounts of
67

money. City Councilors running at-large however, require more funding to reach
residents throughout the city and thus turn to the business community to fill in the gaps.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION
While it cannot be stated that no relationship exists between campaign
contributions and vote choice about tax classification, any relationship that might exist is
minor and not at the observable level that one might expect. This leads us to dismiss the
applicability of the vote-buying and ideological-sorting hypothesis to smaller
municipalities and instead turn our attention to other factors and councilor characteristics.
Previous studies had suggested that city councilors campaign funds were
incredibly dependent on contributions from business owners. Recall that studies had
suggested that over 70% of contributions came from development and business interests.
If this were true, city councilors would be relying almost entirely on the business
community for the essential funds needed to run for office. Even when we look at the
campaign averages by community, we fail to see the kind of dependence that was found
to exist in very large cities in the smaller cities of Massachusetts.
Though there may be several explanations for the absence of any correlation
between contributions and vote choice, there remains reason to believe that when
contributors choose to get involved, they follow an investment strategy rather than an
ideological-sorting or vote-buying strategy. Both vote-buying and ideological-sorting
theories, if occurring, are minor and not easily noticeable, nor are they at a level that
should be cause for concern. Furthermore, the alleged dependence on development
interests was not found in these smaller municipalities, suggesting that political scholars
should continue to expand research in municipal campaign finance outside of the realm
of mega-cities. While City Councilors in New York, Chicago, and other large cities may
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rely heavily on large sums of campaign contributions in order to reach the many voters in
their cities, City Councilors in smaller neighborhoods likely require less funding to get
their name and message out. This lack of dependence on money in general leads to less
funding and in turn dependence from the business community. This interpretation is
further enforced by the financial backing of the business community to at-large
candidates who must reach wider audiences. What’s more, the unexpectedly strong link
between incumbency and business contributions should be further explored in smaller
cities and municipalities. The evidence found here strongly suggests that factors relating
to incumbency are significantly more likely to attract contributors than favorable votes on
policy taken by elected officials. Instead of exploring whether contributions impact votes,
future research will benefit by instead asking, what makes contributors want to support a
candidate in a municipal election?
Regarding real world applicability. The results of this study do not outright
dismiss concerns surrounding campaign finance, but rather suggests that these fears may
be misplaced. Campaign finance reform may not be effective in seeking to limit the
amount of money candidates for public office can accept in an attempt to prevent their
temptation to alter policy positions. Instead, reforms geared towards decreasing the cost
of elections in general may better serve the purpose of limiting any influence of special
interests.
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CHAPTER 8

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES
A possible explanation for the lack of findings may be that this particular research
design did not take into account political strategy utilized by individual councilors as it
assumed, like studies at the congressional level, that councilor votes were made as
rational choices and not through political strategies. Despite open meeting law, as
discussed earlier, it may very well be the case that candidates wishing to move in one
direction or the other, recognizing that they were in the minority, made a motion early to
prevent the entire council from moving too far in the opposed direction. Tax
classification is a unique subject, though it was coded as dichotomous, each councilor is
choosing to support or oppose any number of points on a scale. Thus, a city councilor
who supports moving to support businesses, may choose to back a motion that hurts
commercial properties less so than another potential motion. Despite observing the
meetings repeatedly, without a strong understanding of each individual councilor’s
beliefs, their historic stances, or an interview with them, it is difficult to uncover if such a
strategy has been utilized.
The dominant if not only method of studies that have attempted to determine the
influence of campaign contributions on policy outcomes, at all levels of government, has
focused on a qualitative analysis of vote record. While this is indicative of where a policy
maker stands on a issue, it does not give the observer the full picture of the individual
legislator’s stance. While Bronars and Lott conducted telephone interviews and were able
to gain some information from them, the bulk of their findings were from quantitative
analysis of vote and contribution records. Reducing the complexities surrounding issues
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as intricate as those voted on by legislators to a binary yea or nay vote can be
problematic. There is no scale by which to measure how opposed or how supportive a
legislator is of a policy proposal.
An important piece of the narrative that is absent from this and many other studies
examining the effects of campaign contributions on roll call voting is a qualitative aspect.
While this may be significantly more difficult to do and almost impossible at the
congressional level, there is reason to suspect such an approach may provide new insights
into the effects of campaign contributions on roll call voting. A quantitative analysis that
includes a qualitative portion such as discussions with campaign contributors and policy
makers can be beneficial and further this area of study. This study could have uncovered
potentially diverse and explanatory political strategies with regard to tax classification
that a simple quantitative analysis was unable to do. At no level of government would
such a study be easier to complete than at the local level where communicating with
contributors and councilors is very easy.
The timing of campaign contributions has been discussed in some studies
(Wright, 1990). In this study, campaign contributions were examined from the length of
the elected official’s career, and the past two years, essentially from the last election.
Though this study found no difference in results based on the timing of contributions,
future studies that claim to find a relationship between campaign contributions and vote
choice should seek to answer the question, does the contribution lead to the official’s
vote, or does the vote lead to increased campaign contributions. This chicken and egg
paradox is often assumed to be that contributions lead to changes in vote choice. This
typical interpretation has led to most studies, such as this one, finding no evidence that
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campaign contributions have any sway on the adoption of policy. By approaching this
question from a different angle, scholars may find a new understanding of the role of
money in our political system.
Additionally, this research did not examine the margin of victory of any of these
councilors in their last election. A city councilor with a high margin of victory has reason
to believe that their ability to hold onto their elected office is relatively secure. As such,
they may feel freer to vote according to their own personal ideologies rather than in
accordance with those of their constituents or campaign contributors. Inversely, a
counselor that has been engaged in a close election may feel more compelled to make
decisions that they believe will help them fundraise in future elections or a counselor may
instead choose to appeal to residential concerns. Within this same realm of unexplored
predictors are the views and campaign contributions collected by councilor’s political
challengers.17
This is a variable that has been ignored in studies at the congressional level as
well. There is an argument to be made that if elected officials feel particularly safe in
their next election that they may be more willing to make riskier decisions (Sheffer, and
Loewen, 2019), such as voting against the interest of their constituents or perhaps, voting
against the interests of their major campaign contributors. Maybe an at-risk official will
take a vote that they normally would not in order to appear more friendly to a potential

17

In the case of the 2019 City Council election in Worcester, Councilor Matthew Wally who has routinely
advocated for a single tax rate faced a challenger that stated they would only support a tax rate which was
friendly to residents (Johnathan Honeycutt). Over the course of the election Honeycutt raised $650 to
Wally’s $12,695. Though there are certainly other factors that play into a candidate’s ability to fundraise,
this particular example highlights a direction outside the scope of this study and again suggests the overall
importance of incumbency.
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contributor for needed funds to secure re-election. Future studies should dig deeper into
this line of study to determine if campaign contributions play more of a role for
vulnerable officials.
Several factors hindered this study and should be noted for future attempts to look
more closely at the campaign contributions made to officials in municipal governments.
Firstly, the office of campaign and political finance in Massachusetts does not have data
centrally located on all municipal candidates. Due to time constraints, I was unable to
perform a randomized sampling of communities across Massachusetts and collecting
information directly from town clerks, which would have eliminated potential flaws in
using data from communities that were already more likely to utilize split tax rates. This
also would have eliminated any potential biases relating to the forms of government in
communities that had adopted split rates. Additionally, the definitions used to identify
business owners and or members of the business community, while I believe they were
accurate and effective for the purposes herein, do not necessarily align with the typical
definition of an interest group that we have seen at the congressional level. A preferred
method would have been to directly compare contributors to members of the local
Chamber of Commerce. As many Chambers of Commerce in Massachusetts argue for
lowering the split rate and will often send representatives to classification hearings and
request lower rates.18 Unfortunately, as these chambers are private organizations, their
member lists are not always available to the public and this course had to be abandoned.

18

Some communities in this study had chamber representatives come to their meetings while others did
not.
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This study examined only one meeting per city, however, as has been stated, tax
classification must be voted on by every city annually. A future study with more
available resources may benefit from a randomized sampling of councilor votes from
several cities over a long period of time. Finally, as votes on tax classification are not
necessarily dichotomous, but rather take place on a continuous scale, models outside of
the standard logistic regression model. Though, the information about where a
councilor’s ideal point might have to be obtained through interviews as city councilors
may not elaborate on their intentions at meetings.
Finally, additional predictor variables could have been incorporated to better the
accuracy of results. While no causal impact has been found between fluctuations in
cherry sheets and tax rate adoption, Massachusetts municipalities have been shown to
replace lost state aid with increased property taxes. This leads to a higher overall burden
on residents and may influence an official's vote. Additionally, changes made in
surrounding communities may have some minimal impact on an official vote as well.
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APPENDIX
ADDITIONAL CHARTS AND TABLES AS WELL AS CHANGES MADE
DURING THE CODING PROCESS.

Figure 1. Average CIP Split by Fiscal Year.
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Figure 2. Form of Governments and Split Tax Rates.
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Model Utilizing Contributions over 200 Dollars.
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Table 6. Contributions within the last election cycle
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Figure 3. Heat map of split tax rates in Massachusetts municipalities

*The map above displays communities in Massachusetts that have adopted split tax rates
as of fiscal year 2018. As the difference between the two rates grows, the color of the
community’s changes from green to red. Communities displayed in white did not adopt
split rates in FY 18.
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Table 6. City Averages and Summaries.
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Table 7. Pro Commercial Councilors in Cities with Multiple Proposals.
Municipality

Business
Proportion

Proportion
Donations over
Between Elections
$200.00

Worcester (JP)

*41.27%

*25.73%

21.49%

Worcester (KT)

13.22%

15.15%

13.22%

Worcester (MW)

14.02%

14.48%

14.02%

Fall River

*20.48%

33.88%

*20.58%

Springfield*

*20.14%

*20.14%

20.14%

* Starred averages indicate that the councilor numbers are higher than their respective
city council averages.
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Figure 4. Proportion of Contributions from Business Owners made to City
councilors.

*Frequency delineates the number of city councilors whose proportion of campaign
contributions from businesses correspond with the x-axis.
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Figure 5. Proportion of Contributions from The Business Community to City
Councils as a Whole.

84

Figure 6. Change in CIP Value by Community from FY 18 to FY 19.
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In several cases, the names of city councilors were written out multiple ways
while referring to the same person. This likely happened in one of two ways. Either a
candidate changed their name on their campaign finance reports to OCPF, by including a
middle name, nickname, prefix, etc. or a typo occurred when OCPF entered the data.
Every OCPF dataset was scanned for multiple names referring to the same individual
using the delete duplicates function.

Markey, William/Markey, William Brad/Markey, William B
New Bedford
The middle name Brad and initial B were removed so that every reference to the
councilor read “Markey, William”.

Rosen, Gary/Rosen, Gary
Worcester
While both names are spelled the same, the delete duplicates function returned two
unique outputs revealing a space occasionally typed after Councilor Rosen’s name. These
were changed to all read “Rosen, Gary” without a space.

Essaibi George, Annissa/George, Anissa
Boston
The middle name Essaibi was removed and all spellings were changed to “George,
Anissa”.

Flynn, Edward M./Flynn, Edward Michael
Boston
Councilor Flynn’s middle name was shortened to M. for each occurrence so that it
appeared in the dataset as “Flynn, Edward M.”

Allen, Timothy/Allen, Timothy C.
Springfield
The middle initial C was removed, and all spellings were changed to “Allen, Timothy”.

White Jr., William/WhiteJr. William
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Somerville
Similar to the situation with Gary Rosen, an extra space created an additional councilor.

Giesta, Maria E./Giesta, Maria/Giesta, Maria Eugenia
New Bedford
All three names were changed to “Giesta, Maria”.

DePeña, Brian/DePena, Brian
Lawrence
Depeña was changed to DePena for all occurrences.

Laliberte-Lebeau, Pamela/Laliberte-Leabeau, Pamela
Fall River
In this case, there was a misspelling of councilor Laliberte’s name on OCPF records for a
donation of $300. Only this one misspelling was found and corrected to “LaliberteLebeau, Pamela”.

Cadime, Shawn E./Cadime, Shawn
Fall River
The middle initial E was removed and all spellings were changed to “Cadime, Shawn:.
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